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Abstract: Many non-native insect, disease, and weed pests of food, fiber, and nursery crops pose 
threats to the U.S. environment, agricultural production, and exports. In this study we focus on 
regulations controlling the spread of noxious weeds, especially the regulatory differences among 
US states and investigate the determinants of such regulations. With a simple game-theoretic 
framework, we derive cross-state regulatory congruence as a function of ecological and 
agronomic characteristics and stakeholder lobbying through political contributions.  Empirical 
results suggest ecological and agronomic dissimilarities drive large cross-state differences in 
noxious weed regulation across states.  However, evidence of stakeholder interests in shaping 
these regulations is found to be statistically significant.  In particular, the seed industry appears 
to favor more uniform regulations among US states. 
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valuable suggestions on the research project. Rent-Seeking in Noxious Weed Regulations: Evidence from US States 
Many non-native insect, disease, and weed pests of food, fiber, and nursery crops pose threats to 
the U.S. environment, agricultural production, and exports.  Prominent examples are citrus 
canker and the Mediterranean fruit fly and, more recently, soybean rust (Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service, APHIS, and Economic Research Service, ERS, US Department of 
Agriculture, USDA).  Among such threats, weed intrusions, commonly referred to as noxious 
weeds, have significant environmental and economic impacts (Pimentel et al., 2000).  Unwanted 
weeds can be transmitted, knowingly or unknowingly, from one country or state to another 
through both natural and human channels.   
Noxious weeds are considered to be invasive species (IS), that is, “nonnative, alien, or 
exotic to the ecosystem under consideration, and when introduced, cause, or are likely to cause, 
economic or environmental harm or harm to human health,” (ERS, USDA, 2003).  The Plant 
Protection Act (PPA) prohibits or regulates the spread of such invasive species by authorizing 
the Secretary of Agriculture to publish a federal list of noxious weeds (NXW) and to prohibit or 
restrict their international and interstate commerce.  Simultaneously, provisions of the Federal 
Seed Act (FSA) prohibit or restrict noxious weed seed (NXWS) movements within and at the 
borders of the United States.  More importantly, the PPA and FSA allow each state’s Department 
of Agriculture to maintain additional controls on noxious weeds deemed necessary to the state’s 
ecological, agricultural and environmental interests.   Hence, the definition of noxious weeds 
varies by state, and most states maintain two sets of noxious weed regulations.  Based on FSA, 
the state-level NXWS list regulates interstate trade in seeds using a prohibited (zero tolerance) 
and/or restricted (defined tolerance) list.  The state-level NXW list is often based on the authority 
granted by the PPA but, individual states also have noxious weed laws.  The NXW list, which 
  1regulates interstate in nursery products, often has two sub-lists: an A-list (zero tolerance) and a B-
list for weeds posing a potential danger but whose importation is not necessarily prohibited. 
Unlike the federal NXW and NXWS lists, there exists large cross-state differences in the 
size and composition of these lists.  For instance, figure 1a shows the number of weed species in 
state NXWS lists (excluding Alaska and Hawaii), where Colorado and New York have, 
respectively, the most and least number of weeds.  Figure 1b identifies how many of the weed 
species in California’s NXWS list are also listed in other 47 contiguous states.  Not surprisingly, 
a state’s number of common weeds with that of California decline as we move from west to east.  
In this study we identify and investigate the sources of cross-state differences in NXW 
and NXWS lists.  Specifically, we characterize the basis for state weed regulations by identifying 
stakeholders, and their costs and benefits.
1  Then, we ask why NXWS and NXW lists diverge 
from one state to another.  To answer this question, we develop a political and ecological 
economy model of IS regulation.  In our inter-disciplinary approach, we model the supply and 
demand for IS protection and the resulting equilibrium, which determines the size and 
composition of NXWS and NXW lists.  Three economic interest groups are considered for each 
state: consumers, seed producers and nursery growers, and commodity producers.  For 
consumers, increasing IS protection increases the price of the associated agricultural product by 
reducing its external supply; but it may also protect the ecosystem and to that extent provide 
positive marginal utility.  Seed producers or nursery growers gain from higher prices for their 
products and the increased agronomic-protection embodied in the IS protection.  Like 
consumers, commodity producers face a tradeoff between increased input prices (e.g., seed price) 
but gain from reduced weed intrusions into their state.  We derive the social planner’s problem as 
                                                 
1 For a sample of studies on risk assessment and management of weeds, and broader invasive species, see Eiswerth 
and Van Kooten (2002), Settle and Shogren (2002), National research Council (2002), Lehtonen (2001), Panetta et 
al. (2001), Rejmanek (2001, 1999) and Stocker (2001). 
  2the weighted sum of these three interest-groups’ welfare, where the respective weights are 
functions of lobbying efforts of individual groups.  We then model the choice of IS protection as 
a strategic game between a base state and any other state.  The regulatory congruence between 
these two states’ IS protection provides the basis for our empirical analysis. 
Regulatory congruence represented by an overlap or similarity function, derived from our 
inter-disciplinary approach, is estimated using data on ecosystem and agronomic characteristics 
and on the rent-seeking efforts of the stakeholders or interest-groups.   For this purpose, data are 
compiled on (i) NXW and NXWS lists of  the 48 contiguous states, (ii) states’ ecological 
characteristics from Bailey’s Ecoregions of the United States, (iii) states’ agronomic 
characteristics from USDA, and (iv) stakeholder lobbying (e.g., dollar value of contributions by 
seed producers) from the Institute on Money in State Politics. 
  The next section presents our approach to the demand and supply of noxious weed 
regulation.  Data and the econometric procedure for estimating cross-state regulatory congruence 
are then described.  Discussion of results is followed by a summary and conclusions. 
  
Research Methods 
Central to our research is a political and ecological economy model of IS regulation.  Political 
economy models have become mainstream tools in the analysis of public policies (e.g., Stigler 
1971; Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Goldberg and Maggi 1999; 
Copeland and Taylor, 2004).  In our application of such approaches, we model a prohibited weed 
species list as the consequence of the interplay of the supply and demand for IS protection.
2 
Demand arises from two sources.  First, scientifically based concerns exist about the health of 
                                                 
2 Many of these regulations are considered to be nontariff barriers in agriculture.  For measurement of non-tariff 
barriers and their effects, see Beghin and Bureau (2001), Orden and Roberts (1997), and Hillman (1978). 
  3the local ecosystem if foreign species are introduced.  Second, economic interest groups view IS 
regulations as a way to increase private rents.  The supply of IS regulation is provided by policy  
makers empowered to erect barriers against products containing invasive species.   
Consumers’ Interest in IS Regulation: Given the political boundaries of IS regulation, we begin 
with a social planner’s objective function the state level.  Consider first a state government’s 
policy choices, developed in response to consumer, environmental, and producer interest groups 
(stakeholder) in a state.  Let the state’s representative consumer demand a combination of 
agricultural commodities (food products) and environmental amenities.  The indirect utility 
function of the consumer can be characterized as, V [p(L),  Y,  L , I], where p is the unit price of 
the agricultural good(s) or seed(s) impacted by IS regulation; L is the size or stringency of the 
state noxious weed list; Y is the representative consumer’s income; and I is a vector describing 
the state’s ecosystem.  Consumer price p is positively related to the stringency of regulation 
represented by the weed list’s size, L.  In other words, if IS regulation becomes stringent, the 
production cost of agricultural goods impacted by the regulation rises and therefore, agricultural 
or food price also increases.  Regulatory stringency, L, is also a direct argument in the indirect 
utility function because consumers have ecosystem preferences independent of their food 
consumption interests.  An example of consumers’ ecosystem preference is the aversion towards 
weeds that are fire hazards (e.g., cheat grass) or cause allergies (e.g., ragweed).  
The total effect of increasing L on the representative consumer in a state is found by 
differentiating V with respect to L: 
 ( 1 )       . p dV V V
dL p L L
∂ ∂ ∂ =+
∂ ∂∂
 
We refer to the first right-hand-side term in equation (1) as the market-price effect.  Economic 
theory suggests that  is negative.  However,  / Vp ∂∂ / p L ∂ ∂  is positive because stringent weed 
  4regulations restricts commodity producers’ seed choices, which increases agricultural production 
cost and thus consumer prices.  To the extent that the increase in L protects the environment, the 
second right-hand-side term in equation (1), the ecosystem-preference effect, is positive.  The 
sign of the derivative in equation (1) is either positive or negative depending on the relative 
strengths of these two effects. 
Seed and Commodity Producers’ Interest in IS Regulation: Given a set of agronomic conditions, 
A, producers’ decision-making in the state planner’s model may be represented by two profit 
functions, one each for seed producers and commodity producers.
3  Seed producers’ maximum 
profit function is given by  [ ( ) , , , ], ss s pL L π W A  where L  is defined as in the consumer 
problem, and ps and Ws are, respectively, seed price and the vector of input prices in seed 
production.  As in the standard profit function, profit opportunities are conditioned by output and 
input prices.  In addition, they are directly influenced by weed list L  insofar as the list provides 
seed producers with biological protection from invasive weeds.  Holding A and Ws constant, the 
profit impact of altering the list L  is: 
 ( 2 )        s ss s
s
dp
dL p L L




Note that  / s p L ∂∂  is positive since the stringency of weed regulations provides greater market 
protection to local seed producers.  Since  / s s p π ∂ ∂  is also positive, the first right-hand term in 
equation (2), namely the price-enhancement effect, is positive.
 4  The second right-hand term or 
the agronomic-protection effect, also is positive because the larger the weed list, the greater the 
agronomic protection (lower weed abatement costs) to local producers.  The expected sign of 
                                                 
3 In this section we replace the term “seed producers and nursery growers” by “seed producers” for convenience. 
 
4 However, seed producer profits can be a negative function of the size of lists in jurisdictions to which local 
producers would export.  That is, noxious weed regulation can be perceived as export barriers, if a states’ seed 
producers incur additional costs to obtain certification and/or labeling privileges. 
  5equation (2) is, unlike (1), therefore is positive. 
  The commodity producers’ profit function is given by [ , ( ), , , ] mm s m pp L L π WA , where L  
and A are as defined in the seed producers’ problem,  pm is the aggregate price of final 
commodities, and Wm  is a vector of non-seed input prices.  Because seeds are inputs to 
commodity production,   enters  () s pL m π as an extra input price.  Moreover, commodity 
producers’ profits are directly impacted by L if it provides agronomic protection from invasive 
weeds.  Given A and Wm, the profit impact on commodity producers of altering weed list L is: 
(3)      mm s
s
dp
dL p L L




As before   / s p L ∂∂  is positive but  / ms p π ∂∂  is negative because seeds are inputs rather than 
outputs in commodity production.  Therefore, the first right-hand term in equation (3), which is 
similar to the market-price effect on consumers, is negative.  The second right-hand term or the 
agronomic-protection effect, remains positive since weed protection also applies to commodity 
producers.  The sign of equation (3) thus depends on the relative strength of these two effects. 
The Social Planner’s Problem: Let  c ω ,  s ω , and  m ω  refer respectively to weights the state  
government places on consumer, seed producer, and commodity producer welfare.  Such weights 
are assumed to depend on stakeholder or interest-group lobbying.  The state government’s or 
social planner’s objective function can then be written as (Copeland and Taylor, 2004): 
(4) 
[() , , ,) [ () , , , ]
() m a x
[,( ) , , , ] n
cs s s
L
mm m s m















An alternative representation of the social planner’s problem is: 
(5)  { } ,, ( ) m a x ( ; , ,,) ( ; , ,,
n
n n cs m n cs m L ) Z GL BL Z CL ω ωω ωωω =− IA IA , 
  6Where { , , } s m Z YW W = .  Here, B represents a state’s benefits from IS regulation including the  
eco-system preference effect on consumers, price-enhancement on seed producers and 
agronomic-protection effects on seed and commodity producers.  The cost, C, represents the 
price-enhancement effects on consumers and commodity producers.
5  
   The representation in (5) of the state’s policy problem helps underscore its strategic 
nature.  State i’s choice of L generally depends on state j’s choice because the extent of any 
similarity in the two states’ lists, and thus in the legal constraints facing respective producers, 
affects the competitive framework in both states.  For instance, if the i-th state’s choice, , is 
perfectly matched by the j-th state,  , it alters the benefits and costs of IS regulation to the i-th 
state.  In such a strategic environment, the i-th state’s problem can be recast as one of choosing 
the degree of congruence or overlap between its IS regulation and that of the j-th state.  
Reflecting as it does the observed cross-state quantitative similarities, congruence-based 
accounting has the additional virtue of measuring compositional content of regulations.  Let 
i L
j L
•  Lij  be the percentage overlap between i-th and j-th state’s noxious weed list  (number of 
common species in the two lists divided by the number of species in the i-th state); 
•   Iij  be the vector representing ecosystem dissimilarities between states i and j;  
•  Aij be the vector representing agronomic dissimilarities between states i and j; 
                                                 
5 Note that the first-order condition for maximizing equation (4), 
0 c
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which suggests that the solution to the maximization problem in (5) is the same as that in (4). 
  7•   , be the vector of differences in lobbying efforts between i-th and j-th states, 
distinguished by consumer (c), seed-producer (s), and commodity-producer (m) 
interest groups. 
,, , k
ij kc s m ω =
Objective functions of the i-th and j-th state problems then become:
6
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The reaction functions for states i and j would then be: 
(7)   ,  () ; () ij
ij ji ji ij LR L LR L ==
resulting in a Nash-type solution as follows: 
(8)   . 
** ,, (, , ) , ,
csm
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij LL i ωωω =∀ IA
Equation (8) suggests that the similarity between any two states’ weed import regulations should 
be a function of dissimilarities between (a) their ecosystem and agricultural characteristics, each 
of which demand biological protection, and (b) their relative lobbying or welfare-weight ratios, 
, k
ij ω  which influence producers’ ability to use weed regulations as rent-seeking, import 
protection.  We expect the influence of Iij and Aij on overlap Lij to be negative because when 
ecosystems and cropping patterns differ, weeds regarded as biologically and economically 
damaging should differ also.  That is, larger ecological and agronomic dissimilarities between 
states should lead to lower regulatory congruence. 
  Note that the degree of overlap, Lij, is negatively related to the stringency of the i-th 
state’s regulation ( ).  Because the sign of equation (1) depends on the relative sizes of the 
i L
                                                 
6 We suppress income and factor price differences by assuming integrated factor markets among US states. 
  8market-consumption and ecosystem-preference effects, a rising consumer-welfare weight 
c
ij ω  
might have either a positive or negative effect on a state’s NXW or NXWS regulatory 
congruence with others.  For instance, a negative (estimated) coefficient on 
c
ij ω  in equation (8) 
would identify that consumers’ lobby works to lower overlap, i.e., increase regulatory stringence, 
and their eco-system gains outweigh market-price effects.  Similarly, commodity producer 
interests depend upon the relative strength of producer preferences for lower seed prices versus 
lower weed-abatement costs.  Since seed producers benefit from price increases and agronomic 
protection, we anticipate a negative effect on overlap from their lobbying efforts.  However, if 
seed producers perceive increased regulations as export barriers, then they likely lobby for 
greater regulatory congruence.  Thus, the impact of welfare weights ( ,,
cs
ij ij ij
m ω ωω)  on regulatory 
congruence in equation (8) cannot be predicted  a priori.  
 
Data Description 
To estimate equation (8) we utilize publicly available data.  The following describes our 
database, which includes measures of relevant regulatory congruence and ecological, agronomic, 
and lobbying dissimilarities across states.   
Weed Regulatory Congruence (Lij): Recall that each state has two sets of noxious weed 
regulations: NXWS and NXW lists based respectively on FSA and PPA.  We first compiled all 
50 states’ NXWS lists for the years 1997 and 2002.  However, we excluded Alaska and Hawaii 
because of significant differences in the list size and ecological make-up (tropical versus tundra).  
Each unique species from the 48 NXWS lists is compiled into a global list, which initially 
contained about 1300 weed species.  There were duplications and other typographical errors in 
state NXWS lists, which were eliminated in the compilation of the global list.  While some states 
  9use more recent scientific names for weed species, many continued to use old names.  For 
example, Centaurea repens in Oregon’s list and Acroptilon repens in California’s list refer to the 
same weed (Russian knapweed).  Regulatory congruence is likely underestimated with such 
inconsistencies in the global list.  To overcome this problem, synonyms of each species in the 
global list are obtained from the National Plant Database (http://plants.usda.gov/), and for each 
species, the most recent scientific name is used. 
The global list is coded using state and species indicators, which are used to identify 
regulatory overlap.  For instance, if a species in the global list appeared on two states’ lists, then 
the overlap between the two states is equal to 1.  Such a species comparison is hindered when 
some states list only a genus name with all its species as a noxious weed, e.g., Allium spp., which 
we referred to as the spp problem.  Fortunately, the number of weeds listed this way is relatively 
small (e.g., 31 in 2002), but a handful of genera had over 50 species each.  Adding all species in 
a genus would significantly inflate the NXWS list.  For instance, the number of weeds in the 
Alabama NXWS list with genus and species name is 23 and if the 5 weeds with only a genus 
name (Allium spp., Cuscuta spp., Crotalaria spp., Rumex spp., and Xanthium spp.) were fully 
enumerated, then its NXWS list would contain 240 species.  Arkansas, which also has 23 weeds 
with genus and species name and the same 5 weeds with only a genus name, would then have a 
total of 240 species as well.  Among the weeds with specific genus and species names, Alabama 
and Arkansas have 15 weeds in common.  If  all species in the 5 genera (spp problems) are 
included, the overlap between the two states jumps to 232, about a 1500% increase over the 
overlap when weeds with genus and species names alone are considered.  To resolve this 
inflationary problem, we compare a species with a species and a genus with a genus.  In the 
above Alabama-Arkansas example, the overlap is then equal to 15 + 5, the latter addition 
  10representing a genus comparison.  Most of the spp problems were fixed with our taxonomic 
resolution, but in a few cases a state (A) has listed some species within a genus, while the 
comparator state (B) has only the genus name.  In this case, the number of overlap is set equal to  
the number of explicit species in the concerned genus in state A. 
Each state’s NXWS list has two components: prohibited and restricted lists.  Most states 
imposes zero tolerance on the prohibited noxious weed species, while restricted species have 
defined tolerance (e.g., number per 100 seeds).  Therefore we developed three 48x48 overlap 
matrices, one each for prohibited, restricted and the combined (NXWS) lists:  
48 48
AL AL AL AR AL WY








   
   
where AL, AR and WY denote Alabama, Arkansas and Wyoming, respectively.  The overlap 
matrix is symmetric, where each row corresponds to a state’s number of common weed species  
with all states (including itself).  For example, the first row corresponds to the overlap of 
Alabama’s list with itself and all other 47 state lists.  Note that the diagonal elements of the 
overlap matrix are the number of noxious weeds listed in that state.  Since the number of the 
noxious weeds listed by each state is different, we calculated percent overlap by dividing the 
overlap of noxious weeds in each row by the size of the corresponding state’s list.  For instance, 
the first row of the 48x48 overlap matrix is divided by the number of noxious weeds listed in 
AL.  The diagonal elements of the matrix are equal to 1, while off-diagonal elements vary  
between 0 and 1 depending on the degree of overlap.  
The case of NXW lists is uneven relative to that of the NXWS lists.  Some states do not 
have a NW list as of 2004 (e.g., Mississippi, New Jersey), while others have NW lists that list the 
same weeds in the NXWS list (e.g., Louisiana, Massachusetts).  In other cases, the NW list is 
  11neither established under statutory authority nor enforced by agriculture departments (e.g., 
Georgia).  In this study, only those NXW lists established and enforced under the Plant 
Protection Act of 2000 are considered as regulations.  Therefore, we have 24 and 36 NXW lists 
in 1997 and 2002, respectively.  A 48x48 matrix of NXW-regulation overlap similar to that of 
NXWS lists is constructed with empty cells for comparison between states lacking NXW lists. 
Indexes of Ecosystem Dissimilarities (Iij):  In order to attribute differences in NXW/NXWS list 
to ecosystems characteristics, we first quantify the latter (Rejmanek, 2001).  An ecoregion is “a 
relatively large unit of land or water containing a geographically distinct assemblage of species, 
natural communities, and environmental conditions” (World Wildlife Fund, 1999).  Several 
methods to classify ecoregions have been developed, each with a set of criteria chosen for 
specific objectives.  For instance, Bailey’s (1995) ecoregions delineate continental United States 
into a hierarchical system with four levels: domains, divisions, provinces and sections (Bailey, 
1983; 1995).  Leemans’ (1992) Holdridge Life Zone system uses biotemperature, mean annual 
precipitation and potential evapotranspiration ratio to define provinces, while Omernick’s (1987) 
ecoregions are based on land use, land surface form, potential natural vegetation, and soil types. 
Bailey’s (1995) classification is most widely used (e.g., the US Forest Service) since it 
includes many of the characteristics in the alternative classifications noted above.  We follow 
Bailey’s (1995) classification of the Ecoregions of the United States to derive measures of 
ecological dissimilarities across states.  Specifically, we use the data underlying the classification 
such as land surface form, climate (temperature and precipitation), soil, and surface water 
characteristics to measure ecosystem differences across US states. The data are taken from the 
National Resources Inventory of the Natural Resource and Conservation Service, USDA.  All 
data at the county level are aggregated to obtain state-level indices using counties’ share of state  
  12land as weights.  Thus, the following seven variables are used to represent a state’s ecosystem:  
  Average temperature (mean January temperature) 
  Average precipitation (days of measurable precipitation per year) 
  The variance of temperature and the variance of precipitation measured using county-level 
data on temperature and precipitation in each state.  
  Land index computed using principal component analysis with data on acres of cropland, 
pasture, rangeland, forest, small and large urban area, and miscellaneous acres.  The Land 





















 where  Xr ( ) denotes land acres in each of the categories defined above and ∀r is the 
weight for the r-th category.  
1,..., r = R
  A soil and water index created in a way similar to that of the land index.  The categories of 
soil include sandy, silty, clay, loamy, organic and others, while those for water include water 
body (less than 2, 2-40, more than 40 acres) subdivided into lakes, reservoirs, bay/gulf and 
estuary, and perennial stream based on width (< 66, 66-660 and > 660 feet). 
The land, soil and water index are created also using share rather than the size of each category,  
which we refer to as land share, water share and soil share indexes.  For each ecosystem variable,  
we construct a 48x48 dissimilarity matrix as before: 
48 48
() / () /
() / ( / )
AL AL AL AL WY AL











Each row corresponds to the percentage difference of an ecosystem variable of a state with itself  
and the other 47 states.  For example, the weighted average precipitation of AL, AR and Arizona  
  13(AZ) are 138.27, 124.50 and 30.30 days (of measurable precipitation), respectively. The percent 
difference of precipitation between AL with AL, AL with AR, and AL with AZ are respectively 
0.00, -0.10, and -0.78, which form the first three elements of the first row of the dissimilarity 
matrix.  The above indices shows that the precipitation in AL is more similar to that of AR than 
AZ.   The main diagonal elements of dissimilarity matrix are zero, while the off-diagonal 
elements can take values between negative and positive infinity. 
Indexes of Agronomic Dissimilarities (Aij): We include two variables to represent a state’s 
agronomic characteristics. The irrigated land share of total (state) cropland and the field crop 
land share of total (state) crop land.  Field crops included corn, wheat, barley, soybeans, other 
grains and cotton. These data are obtained from the 2002 and 1997 Census of Agriculture, 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), US Department of Agriculture. Again, a 48x48 
matrix of dissimilarity indexes is constructed for each variable.  
Indexes of Lobbying Dissimilarities ( ,,
cs
ij ij ij
m ω ωω): To represent stakeholders’ interest in 
NXW/NXWS regulation, we obtained data on campaign contributions in state politics (Institute 
on Money in State Politics, www.followthemoney.org).  Specifically, we obtained the number 
and dollar amount of contributions made by industry and interest groups.  From these data we 
identify political contributions of agricultural producers within which we also have data on seed 
producers’ contributions.  Data on nursery industry’s lobby contributions had several missing 
values, which when replaced by zero lead to infinite dissimilarity indexes.  As noted in the 
theory section, seed producers and nursery growers have similar interests, and therefore, we 
combined contributions of seed producers and nursery growers into a single lobby variable.  To 
represent the consumer interest group, we use contributions from consumer and environment-
based groups under the ideology-oriented contributions to state politics.  Thus, we created 2 
  14political-economy variables (dollar and number of contributions) for the 3 stakeholders: seed 
industry (includes nursery growers), commodity producer groups (agriculture less seed producers 
and nursery growers), and consumer- and environment-interest (ideology) groups.  Additionally, 
we constructed dollar and number of contribution shares with respect to state totals for each 
industry.  As before, we constructed a 48x48 dissimilarity-index matrix for each lobby variable.  
Note that the lobbying dissimilarity index,  ( )/
c
ij i j i ω ωω ω =− , continues to be an increasing 
function of the base state’s lobby contribution. 
  The descriptive statistics on regulation overlap and all three categories of explanatory 
variables are presented in table 1.  In general, the NXWS lists show about 30 to 40 percent 
overlap between 1997 and 2002, while overlap in NXW lists is only about 30 percent.  However, 
the variance of overlap has increased for the two sublists of NXWS regulation and the NXW list.  
Lobbying indexes show a general increase between 1997 and 2002, while agronomic variables 
changed little during the same period.  Ecological variables are observed for 1997 only. 
 
Econometric Procedure and Specification Tests 
Given the panel nature (state i and j) of our data set, regulatory congruence in equation (8) is 
estimated using three econometric procedures: ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effects (FE) 
and random-effects (RE) estimators.  For the OLS estimator, equation (8) is rewritten as: 
(9)   0 ij ij ij LX α β ′ =+ + ε                                
where    , 1,...,48, ij = 0 α  is the intercept, Xij is a vector of explanatory variables and β is the 
associated parameter vector of interest and  ij ε  is the random, disturbance term.  The FE 
estimation replaces  0 α  with state-specific intercepts  , 1,...,48 i i α = , as follows:  
  15(10)   ij i ij ij LX α βε ′ =+ +. 
Finally, the random effects specification is similar to equation (9), but the disturbance term  
includes an unobserved, random and state-specific effect i μ :  
(11)   0 ij ij i ij LX α βμ ′ =+ ++ ε . 
The dependent variable Lij is defined as the percentage overlap between i-th and j-th 
states’ noxious weed (NXWS or NXW) regulations. The overlap data vector is of dimension 
2304x1 (48x48 state-pair overlaps), which is constructed by transposing each row of overlap 
matrix and stacking them into a column vector. Since diagonal elements of the percent overlap 
matrix are equal to one, we delete i-th state’s overlap with its own list and consider observations 
when i ≠ j.  Thus, we have 2256 (48x47) observations on Lij for NXWS lists.  Since NXW lists 
apply to fewer states, there are only 870 and 1190 observations of state-pair overlaps in 1997 and 
2002 NXW lists, respectively.  We compute Lij for four lists: NXWS, NXWS prohibited, NXWS 
restricted, and NXW lists.  In the following, we refer to the overlap regression for each of the 
above four lists as List 1 through 4, respectively.    
Consistent with the previous section, the explanatory variables, Xij, fall into three groups: 
(i) ecosystem dissimilarities between i-th and j-th state (Iij) in terms of average temperature and 
precipitation, variance of temperature and precipitation, soil and land types, and water sources (7 
variables), (ii) agronomic dissimilarities between i-th and j-th state (Aij) captured by field crops’ 
and irrigated area share of total crop land (2 variables), and (iii) lobbying dissimilarities between 
i-th and j-th states (ωij) represented by contributions of seed producers, commodity producers 
and the consumer groups (3 variables).  Thus, the 1x12 vector of explanatory variables is given 
by 
17 1 2 [ ,..., , , , , , ]
csm
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij XII A A ω ωω ′ = .  
  16The dependent variable, percent overlap, takes positive values, but the construction of 
dissimilarity indexes of explanatory variables allowed for differences among states take on 
values between negative and positive infinity.  A negative (positive) value of the dissimilarity 
index suggests that the base state’s indicator is relatively higher (lower) than that of the 
comparator state.  Consider the case of temperature differences, where a negative dissimilarity 
index implies that the base state’s average temperature is higher than that in the comparator state.  
Therefore, positive dissimilarities can be hypothesized to have different effects on overlaps than 
the negative indexes.  There is some scientific evidence supporting such differences in effects for 
ecological variables.  For instance, Brown, Stevens, and Kaufman (1996) indicate that an 
introduced species’ relationship with others may differ depending on whether the new 
environment is warmer or colder relative to its native environment.  To further illustrate, 
consider figure 2, where overlap is plotted on the Y-axis and the dissimilarity is represented by 
the positive and negative quadrants of the X-axis.  Larger dissimilarity leads to lower overlap on 
either quadrants.  Therefore, we set up slope and intercept dummies to allow the coefficient on 
any explanatory variable change between negative and positive realizations of the dissimilarity 
index.  We follow up with a test of the restriction that the coefficient is the same regardless of the 
sign of the dissimilarity index.  In the case of lobbying dissimilarities, the positive and negative 
dissimilarity indexes simply reflect relative strength of an interest-group between any two states.   
The general model is then: 
(12)       00 () () ij ij ij ij LD D D X D X α δβ γ ε
+− + − ′′ =++ + +             




 is a set of dummy variables which take value 1 when  , e.g.,    0 ij X >
1
1 10 ; ij Di f X e l s e
+ => . Similarly, when  0 ij X ≤ , dummy variables in  
  1712 1 2 [ , ,..., ] D DD D
−− − =
−  take value 1.  Therefore,  / ij ij LXβ ∂ ∂=  when Xij is positive and  
/ ij ij LXγ ∂∂=  otherwise.   
For the 4 lists noted earlier, we estimated equation (12) using OLS, FE and RE 
procedures for each of the two years: 1997 and 2002.  A number of specification tests and error-
structure analyses are conducted to choose the final specification which best fitted the data.  Due 
to space constraints, we do not report results of specification tests.
 7  The first is the Lagrange 
Multiplier test, which strongly rejected all four OLS specifications in favor of either FE or RE 
regressions.  Next, we rejected the restriction that the coefficient on the dissimilarity index is the 
same regardless of its sign i.e., positive or negative dissimilarity, using a F test in most 
specifications.  To be consistent in reporting, we only report results from specifications with 
asymmetric coefficients.  The Hausman test was then employed to choose between FE and RE 
estimators.  In most cases, the FE effects specification is preferred over the random effects, 
where the latter often assumes that the unobserved, random and state-specific effect is 
independent of explanatory variables.
8  In two cases, we failed to reject the null hypothesis of 
Hausman test, i.e., the RE specification.  However, the coefficients of RE and FE models are 
qualitatively similar with some quantitative differences.  Again, to be consistent in reporting, we 
only present results from only FE models. Our error-structure analysis using a LM test indicated 
the presence of groupwise (state-specific) heteroskedasticity.  So, we utilize the feasible  
generalized least squares estimator with fixed effects to estimate equation (12) for the 4 lists.  
 
                                                 
7A J-test and Cox test indicated that the share-based indexes (soil, land and water) better fit our model compared to 
size-based indexes (Greene, 1997).  Similarly, dollar shares of political contributions are preferred over volume-
based measures (e.g., number or share in total number of contributions). 
 
8If the difference between the variance-covariance matrix of FE and RE model is not positive definite, the chi-
squared statistic of the Hausman test can take negative values.  We obtained few negative values, where Greene 
(1997) suggests setting the Hausman statistic to zero. 
  18Discussion of Results  
Table 2 and 3 report the estimated slope parameters of List 1 through 4 for 1997 and 2002, 
respectively.  The intercept dummies in equation (12), i.e., ( ) 00 , α δ , are not presented due to 
space limitations.  Results in table 2 and 3 relate the four representations of regulatory 
congruence to dissimilarities in ecosystem, agronomy, and lobby strength across states.  So, 
coefficients are interpreted as effects of dissimilarities between a base state and a comparator 
state on regulatory congruence between the two states.  Since fewer states have NXW lists with 
varying degree of control, the following discussion weighs more on results from NXWS list. 
Ecological Dissimilarities and Regulatory Congruence: In table 2, we first present the results on 
ecological variables, each of which had two coefficients corresponding to the sign or strength of 
dissimilarity between the base and comparator states.  Consistent with the hypothesis in figure 2, 
we obtained significant negative slope coefficients for most temperature and precipitation 
indexes when the strength of dissimilarity is biased toward the comparator state. Similarly, when 
the dissimilarity index favored the base state, most coefficients on temperature and precipitation 
indexes have the expected positive sign with statistical significance.  There are a few exceptions, 
mostly in List 4.  With regard to the 2002 results in table 3, we find that the effects of ecological 
variables, proxied by temperature and precipitation dissimilarities, are similar to those in table 2 
(1997).  For each of the two years, of the 32 coefficients representing temperature and 
precipitation dissimilarities, only 4 have the unexpected sign with statistical significance.  In 
general, the above results suggest that the relationship between ecological characteristics and 
noxious weed regulatory differences is best illustrated by figure 2.  That is, divergence in 
ecological characteristics, represented by average and variance of temperature and precipitation, 
is an important determinant of NXWS and NXW regulatory congruence across states.    
  19Other ecosystem differences represented by land, soil and water share (dissimilairty) 
indexes do not significantly affect regulatory congruence as illustrated in figure 2.  Of the 24 
coefficients on land, soil and water share indexes, only 4 have the expected sign with statistical 
significance (table 2).  In 2002 (table 3), only the coefficients on water share index are 
significant in List 2.  These results prompted additional tests on the relevance of land, water and 
soil indexes for regulatory congruence.  Restricting their coefficients to zero or only a subset to 
zero (e.g., land and water share) did not alter the results on other included variables.  Since some 
of these restrictions are rejected and the efficiency losses are minimal, we retain all 3 variables in 
List 1 through 4.  We suspect that the information embodied in land and water indexes is likely 
captured in agronomic and precipitation indexes, respectively.   
Agronomic Dissimilarities and Regulatory Congruence: With regard to agronomic dissimilarities 
biased in the direction of the base state (negative quadrant), the coefficients on field crop indexes 
have the expected sign with statistical significance in List 1, 2, and 3 (table 2).  When 
dissimilarities are positive, again the field crop and irrigated land share indexes mostly have a 
significantly negative coefficient (List 1, 3, and 4).  However, those on the irrigated land share 
index are mixed when dissimilarities are biased toward the base state.  Overall, only one of the 
twenty coefficients on agronomic dissimilarities has the unexpected sign with statistical 
significance.  The results for 2002 are similar to those in table 2 (1997).  As in the case of 
ecological dissimilarities, the most common results suggest that the relationship between 
agronomic characteristics and regulatory congruence is best illustrated by figure 2. 
Table 4 presents a summary of the direction of the effects of ecological and agronomic 
dissimilarities on NXWS and NXW regulatory congruence.  A blank space in table 4 indicates 
lack of statistical significance.  As noted earlier, we mostly obtained positive coefficients when 
  20the strength of dissimilarity favored the base state and vice versa.  Since fewer states have NXW 
lists with varying regulatory control, the emphasis in the above and the following sections is on 
results from NXWS list.   
Interest Groups’ Effects on Weed Regulation: Recall that the lobbying dissimilarity index 
measures the political strength of an interest group, e.g., seed producer, relative to its counterpart 
in the comparator state.  For 1997, the effect of consumer lobbying in List 3 shows a pattern 
similar to that observed for most agronomic and ecological indexes.  That is, when the base 
state’s consumer lobby is stronger than its counterpart in the comparator state, the two states 
have lower regulatory overlap.  Likewise, when the comparator state has a relatively stronger 
consumer-lobby, the two states have larger regulatory differences.  A similar effect is also 
observed in the case of List 1. However, coefficients on consumer lobby index in other lists are 
not significant with the exception of List 4, where a significant coefficient has the opposite sign 
of that in List 3.  For 2002, List 1 and 4 have the expected negative coefficient when 
dissimilarity is biased towards the comparator state. Relating to equation (1), results from table 2 
and 3 show a net negative effect of relative consumer lobby on regulatory congruence, which 
implies that their eco-system preference gains dominate the market-consumption effect.  
Dissimilarities in seed industry’s lobbying activities did not significantly affect noxious 
weed regulations in 1997 (table 2).  However, its lobbying effect becomes significant in List 2 
and 4 for 2002 when the strength of the dissimilarity is biased toward the base state.  That is, the 
greater is the relative strength of the base state’s seed lobby, the larger the regulatory congruence 
between the two states.  Recall from equation (2) that seed producers benefit from price-
enhancement and agronomic-protection effects.  However, we noted following equation (8) that 
seed producers could perceive weed regulations as export barriers, in which case they likely 
  21lobby for regulatory congruence across states.  Our seed lobby strength results from table 3 (List 
2 and 4) suggest this latter scenario, i.e., base state’s relatively strong seed lobby favors 
regulatory congruence.  Evidence of such activity can be found in the Recommended Uniform 
State Seed Law by the Association of American Seed Control Officials, which outlines common 
procedures for labeling, complaint, and dispute settlement in seed certification and trade across 
states.  The American Seed Trade Association and the American Nursery and Landscape 
Association also promote development of domestic seed and nursery-product markets and 
address regulatory issues across states.  So, it is likely that states with significant seed or nursery 
production (e.g., Oregon, California) lobby for regulatory congruence across states.   
  Most coefficients on commodity producers’ lobby index are not significant in table 2 
(1997) with List 4 being an exception.  However, results for 2002 show a pattern similar to that 
illustrated in figure 2 for List 1 and 3 (table 3).  The other significant coefficients, one each in 
List 2 and 4, have signs opposite of those shown in figure 2.  Relating equation (3) to the results 
from List 1 and 3, it appears that commodity producers’ gains from agronomic protection more 
than offset the price-enhancement effect.   
Statistical significance confirms stakeholders’ input, but does not provide information on 
their relative importance.  To infer on the latter, we use a variance decomposition approach from 
Fields (2003).  The variance of the dependent variable, regulatory congruence, is first 
decomposed into that explained by the explanatory variables and the residual.  In our case, the 
explanatory variables including the fixed effects explained about 60 percent of the variance of 
regulatory overlap in all four lists for 1997 and 2002.  Of this 60 percent, the share of all 3 lobby 
variables ranged from -6 to 9 percent in 2002, while the range for 1997 is 2 to 10 percent.  The 
rest is accounted by ecological and agronomic dissimilarities and state-specific effects.  
  22Figure 3 outlines common results obtained for the relative lobby strength of stakeholders 
from table 2 and 3.  In the case of seed producers, base state’s lobby strength relative to the 
comparator state leads to regulatory congruence.  The net negative effect of consumer lobby on 
regulatory congruence suggests that its market-consumption effect is more than offset by gains 
from protection to the local eco-system.  For commodity producers, the net negative effect of 
lobbying on regulatory congruence implies that the price-enhancement effect of regulation is 
dominated by agronomic-protection gains. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this study, we identify large differences in two sets of noxious weed regulations, the Noxious 
Weed Seed (NXWS) and the Noxious Weed (NXW) list, among US states.  We then investigate 
the determinants of such regulations, which can impact interstate trade in plant and plant 
products, including interest-groups’ activities.  An inter-disciplinary approach, with ecological 
and political considerations, is taken to model the supply and demand for noxious weed 
regulation.  We consider three stakeholders for each state: consumers, seed producers and 
nursery growers, and commodity producers.  Given the social welfare function, a weighted sum 
of net benefits to each interest group, the regulatory choice is derived from a strategic game 
between a base state and any other comparator state.  The resulting regulatory congruence or 
similarity between any two states provides the basis for our empirical analysis. 
Regulatory congruence in NXWS and NXW lists across contiguous US states is 
estimated using data on ecosystem and agronomic characteristics, and on the rent-seeking 
activities.  Results from our empirical analysis suggest that ecological dissimilarities, embodied 
in temperature and precipitation patterns, give raise to variations and hence, limited regulatory 
  23congruence across US states.  Likewise, agronomic dissimilarities, represented by the share of 
irrigated land and field crops in a state’s arable land, bring about regulatory differences across 
states.  Together, ecological and agronomic characteristics account for two-thirds of the 
explained variation in the size and composition of NXWS and NXW lists of US states. 
Stakeholders’ interest in noxious weed regulations is modeled using their political 
contributions.  Consumers’ lobby impact on regulations reveals their interest in ecosystem 
protection over the market-price effects embodied in such regulations.  However, commodity 
producers’ lobby impacts show a preference for the agronomic protection provided by these 
regulations over market-price impacts.  Our results identify an upward-sloping relationship 
between regulatory congruence and seed producers’ lobby.  That is, a stronger seed lobby leads 
to greater regulatory congruence.  This result can arise if seed producers’ perceive noxious weed 
regulations as export barriers.  Evidence of such perception can be found in the activities of the 
Association of American Seed Control Officials, American Nursery and Landscape Association 
and others, who recommend conformity of weed laws across states.     
Nevertheless, the limited weed regulatory congruence across states should be a concern 
to policymakers working toward a more integrated seed and horticultural product markets among 
US states.  Lobbies of states with significant seed production or national seed organizations 
appear to support such integration, while some interest groups within the state (e.g., commodity 
producers) are likely concerned about agronomic consequences.  The challenge is to work 
toward a more uniform definition of noxious weed regulations and greater overlap across states 
without compromising concerns of commodity producers.   The next question to address is 
whether or not the limited regulatory overlap affects interstate trade flows in plant and plant 
products. 
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  26Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on Regulatory Differences and Explanatory Variables 
(2256 Observations) 
 
Dependent Variables  Unit Mean Std.Dev. Minimum  Maximum
NWS list regulatory overlap            
 2002  NA 0.428 0.182  0.083  0.963
 1997  NA 0.411 0.186  0.057  1.000
NWS-prohibited list regulatory overlap           
 2002  NA 0.401 0.269  0.000  1.000
 1997  NA 0.320 0.202  0.000  1.000
NWS-restricted regulatory list overlap           
 2002  NA 0.411 0.269  0.000  1.000
 1997  NA 0.319 0.197  0.000  1.000
NW list regulatory overlap
a          
 2002  NA 0.302 0.295  0.000  1.000
 1997  NA 0.310 0.268  0.000  1.000
          
Independent Variables          
Lobby Variables            
Seed producers           
 2002  $  108618 189283  550  1040040
 1997  $ 92233 169980  250  1010680
Consumers          
 2002  $ 364199 551105  2500  2564890
 1997  $ 253955 624000  5000  4206990
Commodity producers           
 2002  $ 775331 1272660  15865  6476520
 1997  $ 556395 933924  4550  5179920
Agronomic Variables          
Irrigated land share           
 2002  Acre/Acre 0.177 0.221  0.002  0.794
 1997  Acre/Acre 0.178 0.238  0.002  0.901
Field land share           
 2002  Acre/Acre 0.686 0.171  0.296  1.030
 1997  Acre/Acre 0.685 0.172  0.310  1.089
Ecological Variables
b          
Average Temperature   January temperature 52.498 7.684  40.161  70.902
Average Precipitation  Days of precipitation 88.450 33.930  21.713  142.551
Variance of Temperature  NA 5.419 6.196  0.000  37.893
Variance of precipitation  NA 266.549 895.464  0.000  4849.02
Land Share Index
c  Index 0 1.00 -1.785  1.8340
Water Share Index
c Index 0 1.00  -1.210  3.981
Soil Share Index
c Index 0 1.00  -1.447  2.592
a Number of observations is 1190 and 870 respectively for 2002 and 1997 
b NORSIS, US Forest Service data. 
c Based on principal component analysis. 
 
  27Table 2. Estimates of Cross-State Weed Regulatory Congruence, 1997  
Slope Coefficients
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** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively; number in parenthesis is standard error. 
aI1 through I7 indicate ecological dissimilarity indexes, A1 and A2 are agronomic dissimilarity indexes, and ωk, 
k=c,s,m, denote lobbying dissimilarity indexes. 
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Table 3. Estimates of Cross-State Weed Regulatory Congruence, 2002  
Slope Coefficients
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** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively; number in parenthesis is standard error. 
aI1 through I7 indicate ecological dissimilarity indexes, A1 and A2 are agronomic dissimilarity indexes, and ωk, 
k=c,s,m, denote lobbying dissimilarity indexes.  List 1  List 2  List 3  List 4 
 NWS  NWS-Prohibited  NWS-Restricted  NW 
Dissimilarity Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive
 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997
 
Average Temperature   +   - +   -   -   -     -
Average Precipitation   +   - +   - +   - +
Variance of Temperature    -   -   -   -   -
Variance of precipitation  +   -     - +   -   -   -
Land Share Index    -
Water Share Index    - +   -  -
Soil Share Index       
30
+ -
+ -+ + -+ -
        
Irrigated Land Share       -   -   +   -   -
Filed Crop Land Share            
            
  2002 2002 2002  2002 2002 2002  2002  2002 
Average Temperature   +   - +   -   -   - +   -
Average  Precipitation  +   - +   - +   - +
Variance of Temperature    -  -   - +   -   -   -
Variance of precipitation    -     - +   -   -
Land Share Index 
Water Share Index  + -
+ - + -
+ -+ + -+
  
Soil Share Index         
Irrigated Land Share             
Filed Crop Land Share           









+ Dissimilarity  - Dissimilarity 
-∞ + ∞ 
0 
1







+ Seed Lobby 
Dissimilarity 
- Seed Lobby 
Dissimilarity 
-∞  +∞ 
0 
1
+ Consumer or Commodity  
Producer Lobby Dissimilarity 
- Consumer or Commodity 
Producer Lobby Dissimilarity 
-∞  +∞ 
0 
1
Overlap 
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